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This paper examines the relevance of Corporate Governance in Nigerian 
Banks. Although corporate governance is of general interests to the Nigerian 
public, that of the banking industry is of particular interest because of the 
published figures, attributes and activities of the banking institutions. 
Because every economy world-over has migrated to a ``money and 
exchange'' economy, the basic instrument to facilitate exchange and lubricate 
international trade is money. Due to the catalytic roles of banks in any 
economy, their corporate governance is of prime interest to government, 
depositors, shareholders and the public at large. The study became necessary 
as a result of recent events both globally and locally in which we witnessed 
massive failure of large companies, including banks, which have been mainly 
attributed to fraud and mismanagement by Directors and Managers of such 
Companies. The study employed the secondary source of data on corporate 
governance and its application in Nigerian banks. The study revealed that 
poor corporate governance, poor risk management practices, inability to 
manage expansion, low assets quality, inadequate supervisory framework and 
unethical practices among top banking chiefs who gave out loans without 
required collateral were identified as some of the reasons for the current 
financial crisis in the country. The key recommendation is that the banks 
should be made to provide a certain minimum amount of information 
requirement on corporate governance. 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance has in recent years assumed considerable significance as a 
veritable tool for ensuring corporate survival since business confidence usually suffers each 
time a corporate entity collapses. Most of the business failures in the recent past are 
attributed to failure in corporate governance practices. For instance, the collapse of banks in 
Nigeria in the early 1990s and the recent distress of some Nigerian banks were as a result of 
inadequate corporate governance practices. Poor corporate governance, poor risk 
management practices, inability to manage expansion, low assets quality, inadequate 
supervisory framework and unethical practices among top banking chiefs who gave out 
loans without required collateral were identified as some of the reasons for the current 
financial crisis in the country.      
It was observed by Omofaye (2009), that the various regulatory and supervisory 
agencies are also to be blamed for the problem. Poor monitoring by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporations, Security and Exchange 
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Commission and the Nigerian Stock Exchange to check some of the excesses of the Chief 
Executive Officers has been considered factors responsible for the problem.  Signs of 
distress in the banking sector became obvious from October 2008, when some deposit-
money-taking banks became permanent clients of the Expanded Discount Window facility 
of the CBN an indication of a serious problem. The lead regulatory body, CBN, then 
directed a special examination of the 24 banks operating in the country to ascertain the 
extent of the problem.   
The outcome revealed that non-performing loans of some banks exceeded their 
shareholders funds. Eight of the banks were not only insolvent - meaning that their capital 
adequacy was less than 10%, they were also found to be illiquid - meaning that their deposit 
ratios were less than 25%. To save the situation, the CBN intervened through two ways - by 
providing financial assistance of 620 billion naira and technical assistance, through the 
replacement of the affected bank chiefs with new management, with the mandate to stabilize 
the banks (US$1=150 Naira). Based on this background, the objective of this study is to 




Data used for this study were obtained from the secondary sources such as 
newspapers, magazines, journal articles, text books and the internet. The data obtained were 
those on corporate governance and their application in Nigerian banks. 
 
Corporate Governance Development 
Whilst there would appear to be an upsurge in the literature on corporate governance 
development across the globe (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Demirag, 1998; Solomon and 
Solomon, 2004), there is still a lacuna in the literature on corporate governance 
development, especially in the developing world. Although some authors (Mallin & Jelic, 
2000; Ow-Yong & Guan, 2000; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000; Apreda, 2001; Hussain & Mallin, 
2002; Fremond & Capaul, 2003, amongst others) provide evidence of corporate governance 
development in some developing countries, there is little evidence of corporate governance 
development in Africa, with the exception of South Africa (Yasaki, 2001) provides some 
evidence of the evolution of corporate governance in Nigeria, albeit within the banking 
sector. 
Although not much is known about the state of corporate governance in Nigeria, 
there is evidence of researches (Wallace, 1989; Okike, 1989), which have examined the 
accounting and financial reporting framework in Nigeria. Furthermore, Okike (1999) 
provide detailed accounts of the audit reporting environment in Nigeria.  
Corporate Governance is often applied narrowly to questions about the structure and 
functioning of Boards of Directors, (Blair 1995:3). This view is found amongst some 
business school scholars and management consultants. Corporate governance can also be 
defined as the structure whereby managers at the organizational apex are controlled through 
the Board of Directors, its associated structures, executive incentive, and other schemes of 
monitoring and bonding. This view was reflected by his colleague, a former McKinsey 
consultant, in Strictly Boardroom (Hilmer 1993). 
Corporate governance refers to the organizational framework for decision making 
and action taking within a corporate entity. In this regard it can be defined as the structure of 
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relationships within an entity for making decisions and implementation. Simply put, it refers 
to how an organization is run, that is, how the resources of an organization are employed in 
pursuant to the set mission and goals of the organization. Corporate governance is not just a 
set of rules but also a structure of relationships geared towards establishing good corporate 
practice and culture. 
The above definitions are summarized into one by the Report of the Committee on 
Corporate Governance of Public Companies in Nigeria (2003) which sees corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies in Nigeria are directed, and managers are 
held accountable for the performance of the organization.” This further emphasizes the fact 
that the concept of corporate governance is principally on the structure of relationship within 
an organization which is directed at best practice in the overall interest of the organization 
and its owners/stakeholders. Corporate governance can also be seen as being concerned with 
the structures within which a corporate entity receives its basic orientation and direction. 
Corporate governance sets the pace that in turn determines the corporate culture of an 
organization on the long-run. 
 
Corporate Governance in the Nigerian Banking Industry  
The core issues in corporate governance in any country are the composition of Board 
of Directors, the activities/responsibilities of members, the roles of nominal directors and the 
use of independent auditors. The complexity and trouble with most companies including 
banks in Nigeria is that the directors work to the answer, mark their own examination 
scripts, score themselves distinctions and initiate the applause. But to the stakeholders 
(especially the equity owners), the excellent report sheets are openly fudged or at best 
engineered and indeed, the activities of boards are so varied and deceptively intractable that 
the more critically one looks, the less one sees. It becomes more elusive considering the 
corporate concept which assigns to a company, a status of legal entity with statutory rights 
and responsibilities separate from the owners and executives.  
Further problems arise when a comparison is made between the vastly unstructured 
private limited liability companies in Nigeria and the public liability companies. Whereas 
the former is known for its simplicity and effective management, facilitating the provision of 
capital, encouraging business growth, inducing innovation in industry/commerce and 
creating wealth, the latter which is the vogue in business circles and global markets is 
fraught with lethargy, nonchalance and lack of personal touch due to the legal separation of 
ownership from management.  
In spite of this legal complexity, it is often the case even in Nigeria that ownership is 
the basis of power exercised through the Annual General Meetings (AGM) of companies, an 
occasion where the shareholders wine and dine, nominate and elect their Directors who, in 
the conventional wisdom and legal fiction provided by Company and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) 1990 (as amended) reciprocate through accountability as mirrored in their regular 
reports and audited financial statements. It is true today in most developing nations and 
globally doubtful if the maxim of shareholder democracy is achievable in spite of the 
normative appeal. Particularly in Nigeria, the concept of shareholder democracy is an 
anachronism in that individual shareholders are hardly able to exercise any influence unless 
they have sufficient and dominant shareholdings. Thus, the conventional wisdom that 
shareholders determine Board membership and influence corporate direction is, by and 
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large, false in spite of the constant call on shareholders by Nigerian media commentators 
and the various Shareholders' Associations to exercise their rights and power.  
It seems that within the Nigerian context, it is only the institutional and relationship 
investors that appear to have some influence on Boards especially if several of them collude 
or act in congruence. In fairness to Boards of some blue-chip Companies (both in the real 
and service sectors), they go the extra mile to communicate with and carry along, their 
shareholders through various meetings, the array of published materials, videos of Annual 
General Meetings, shareholders' forums and a host of other ways to meet and question the 
Directors. All these communication channels simultaneously serve to maintain shareholder 
participation in governance as well as influence stock prices positively especially when 
trying to raise fresh funds for corporate capacity building. 
Although corporate governance is of general interests to the Nigerian public, that of 
the banking industry is of particular interest because of the published figures, attributes and 
activities of the banking institutions. Because every economy world-over has migrated to a 
``money and exchange'' economy, the basic instrument to facilitate exchange and lubricate 
international trade is money. Due to the catalytic roles of banks in any economy, their 
corporate governance is of prime interest to government, depositors, shareholders and the 
public at large. 
While government and the public want a safe, sound and stable banking industry 
(Umoh, 1994), depositors are more interested in the safety and returns on their deposits as 
well as quality of services rendered by their banks. On the other hand, shareholders (owners) 
are more interested in their banks' profitability, soundness and good health while the 
employees are interested in their sustained employment through the continued existence and 
profitability of their employer - banks. Given this myriad of interests, it is not surprising that 
the governance of Nigerian banks has become very political and volatile. Governance of any 
banking institution in Nigeria is centrally placed in the hands of the Board of Directors. 
Given the multiplicity of interests in any bank, much is expected of the Board 
members, a situation which partly informs their sanctioning and approval by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria irrespective of what the shareholders think of any Director. To this extent, 
appointment to the board of any Nigerian bank differs markedly from those of other private 
sector corporate institutions. To satisfy the various interests, there is little argument about 
the responsibilities of banks' Boards of Directors which include, amongst others, the 
following (Conger et al., 1998, NDIC, 1991): 
(a)  Development of corporate vision, mission and business strategy 
(b)  Ensuring that a strategic planning process is in place, used and producing sound 
choices. 
(c)  Monitoring and supervising the implementation of current strategic initiatives to 
ensure effective results. 
(d)  Ensuring that the bank has the highest caliber of Chief Executive Officers and 
management team. In this case, the Board must find and groom the appropriate 
chemistry between the rare, critically important breed of internal entrepreneurs and 
the experienced operators to assume governance of the organization in a succession 
plan. 
(e)  Being the ultimate oversight body, it must be satisfied that adequate information, 
control and audit systems are in place in addition to its responsibility of corporate 
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compliance with legal and ethical standards imposed by the law and the banks own 
statement of values. 
(f)  Preventing and managing crisis, that is, responsibility for risk management. 
(g)  Must have a clear idea of how to differentiate the role of Board of Directors from 
that of bank management. 
(h)  It is the ultimate decision taker although from all practical purposes, much of the 
authority is delegated to senior and general management staff and in fact, amongst 
some new generation banks, this authority has been completely abdicated. 
 
It is tempting, though presumptuous to examine and present a straight-jacket 
proposal about how a bank's Board should fulfill its responsibilities. There currently exist 
very scanty authoritative reports of what a Nigerian Board of Directors actually should do 
regarding their specific functions and tasks. The NDIC (1991) Pocket Guide only provides a 
“quick and dirty” manual. However, what can be done is to give the conceptual but feasible 
profile of members of Board which must be composed of people of integrity and good 
judgments, whose knowledge/background and experience must absolutely match the 
strategic demands facing the bank. 
 
Processes of Corporate Governance in Nigerian Banks 
 There is no doubt that the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (CAMA) places 
enormous responsibilities in the hands of Board members of any Company (see section 
282). Similarly, the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (1991) has put additional 
responsibilities by spelling out the responsibilities of bank Directors. The main process of 
governance in Nigerian banks is three-pronged: 
a) Composition in terms of competence, knowledge, experience and business network 
b) Strategy in terms of organizing the board, running the Board, team work and tenure 
of Board of Directors’ members 
c) Action in terms of responsibility, commitment, performance indicators, monitoring 
and evaluation 
 
 In terms of composition, the usual practice in nominating Executive Directors is to 
look for highly qualified and experienced people with the business connection first from 
amongst the staff failing which an executive search is made outside. This is common with 
the big and medium-sized banks. As for the new generation banks, the composition is more 
in favour of ownership, family relationship and cronies. In terms of organizing and running 
the Board, the process is first to determine the ratio of executive to non-executive Directors. 
In the Nigerian setting, the big banks tend to have bigger Boards than medium size banks. 
The second step in the process is to delineate the boundary of influence of the non-
executives, thirdly determine the committee system and decide which of the committees are 
``no-go'' areas for the nominal Directors including the Chairman. In other words the 
Managing Director/Chief Executive officer leads the Executive directors and the members 
of general management while the Chairman only leads the Board of Directors. In some cases 
especially in the new generation banks, the Chairman is also the Chief Executive even 
though there is a managing director in place. 
Also, part of the process strategy is the conduct and frequency of Board of Directors’ 
meetings. For the old banks, the Boards of Directors meetings are quite regular (at least once 
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in two months) and this is quite understandable given their network and total share of the 
market. In the medium-sized banks, the Executives hate meetings and would prefer not to 
have them at all so as to use the time for bank marketing.  
Furthermore, the issue of the tenure of Doard of Directors today is that the big 
players in the banking industry have now put in place an effective and enduring tenure 
system based on such parameters as age, length of service and maximum number of terms 
on the Board. Three of the biggest banks in Nigeria have introduced a tenure system of six 
years with a statutory age limit of 60 years for Executive Directors and 70 years for non-
Executive Directors. 
In terms of actions and responsibilities, many tend to be delegated to senior and 
general management who do the business analysis and present recommendations to the 
relevant Board members for ratification with only occasional questioning for more 
information. But depending on the personality of the Executive Director or even the 
Chairman, he may get involved in more than mere ratification or approval, although their 
job is not to slow down the train but keep it on track. 
Irrespective of the size of the bank, one common responsibility that Boards never 
delegate is the bank performance and its measurement because they know that this is the 
first concrete index with which to judge or condemn their performance at the Annual 
General Meetings. Within the Nigerian context however, the critical issues are not those of 
the processes but rather the problems of corporate governance of banks. 
 
Problems of Corporate Governance in Nigerian Bank 
 A critical assessment would reveal that both endogenous and exogenous problems 
became institutionalized in the banking system as well as the society's core values which 
impinge on the good governance of banks in the 1990's and carried over into the twenty first 
century; such major problems include the following: 
 
Pressure from the environment  
There were two types of pressures, namely those from friends and relations and those from 
the underground or informal sector. On the one hand, it was usual to find friends and 
relations putting pressures on Board members for favours such as business contracts, 
employment of incompetent and sometimes unqualified personnel as well as seeking 
loans/advances which went sour even before approval and drawdown The other source of 
pressure was from business influencers who sometimes insisted on a ``price'' or ``percentage 
rent'' from a business relationship that developed between the bank and the third party 
Company. In this case, the agency fee (often christened as ``lubrication of the informal 
sector'') was paid, though out of tune with the bank's core values and practices. The lessons 
of experience in the Nigerian environment were that these types of rent seeking quickly 
reduce the level of corporate governance of our banks.  
 
Instability of contract / tenur  
Everybody agrees that for any organization to be stable, the governing body should also 
enjoy some level of stability in the tenure system. The private sector in Nigeria in the 1990s 
exhibited too many sudden changes and/or dissolution of Boards of Companies even when 
such an institution was not government owned as long as it operated in any of the strategic 
sectors (petro-chemical, banking, etc). However, it must be added that since the Federal 
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Government divested from the banking industry in 1993, there has been a good degree of 
stability in the erstwhile public banks.  
Instability of Board of any bank has great consequences on the bank's governance 
and performance. Unstable tenure tends to breed insecurity in Board members, some of 
whom might devise ways of quickly ``settling'' themselves by engaging in fleet-footed 
activities. There was the real issue of waning confidence on the part of the competent and 
qualified men of integrity who refused to take up Board appointments for the simple reason 
of not soiling their names by an announcement dissolving the Board because of ``non-
performance'', ``declining productivity'', ``uncompromising posture'', ``sturbonness'', and 
such other abrasive qualifications. 
 
Government action  
It was paradoxical that although the government through its agency, the NDIC, was 
interested in ensuring stability, safety and soundness of banks, their actions usually 
portended the opposite. This was particularly so when considering the huge amount of 
sovereign debts emanating from governments' direct loans/advances while also guaranteeing 
several others for parastatals, all of which went sour and lingered for a long time before the 
draconian resolution in 1998 which authorized the payment of only the principal sums. The 
issue here is not the succour resulting from part payments per se, but the mismatch 
experienced in banks' asset/liability management and the consequent haemorrhage suffered 
by the industry for as long as the sovereign debt lasted. In spite of the payment of the 
principal sums, could the question not be posed whether or not, such 100 per cent interest 
waiver over the huge sovereign debts contributed immensely to the demise of many of the 
liquidated banks?  
 
Board/management relationship  
The relationship between the Board and management should be mutual and complementary 
in order to flag the right signal to the investing and/or consuming public. At the same time, 
the policing role of the Board of Directors cannot be abdicated so as to ensure 
accountability. In theory, there is clear delineation between the functions of both but it is 
almost impossible to draw the real boundary line. Therefore when the Board engages in the 
day-to-day operations of the bank rather than policy and strategic issues, there will be role 
conflicts as witnessed in the ``big four'' banks in the 1990s when government used to 
appoint Board members. The consequences of such conflicts include: 
*  The governance of the bank will suffer because the Board will waste their energies 
on operational and tactical problems. 
*  Rivalry will develop between Chairman and Managing Director, between Board and 
Management as well as between Executive Directors and other Directors whereby 
the executives see the non-executives as interlogers rather than team-mates and 
confidants. All these rivalries would lead to as many divergent opinions and 
behaviours as there are camps. This was the case in state-owned banks in the 1990's 





Akinyomi, O. J.:    Relevance of Corporate Governance in Nigerian Banks 
- 223 - 
 
 
Executive Chairmanship / Vice-Chairmanship  
One aspect of the governance problems of the banking industry in Nigeria today is a 
situation where the Chairman / Vice Chairman of Board is not satisfied with his/her role as 
nominal Director, moderating the excesses of the Managing Director/chief Executive 
officer. He/she therefore takes on the role of the Executive (Vice) Chairman, a situation 
which could lead to abuse of power and bank mismanagement as was witnessed in the 
banking industry in the 1990s where the Executive Chairman could sit in judgment over 
his/her own activities. This observation also exposed the moral issue on the expected 
transparency, accountability and the police-role of the Chairman / Vice-Chairman. 
 
Insider dealings   
In a bank business, a major component in the balance sheet is the loans/advances portfolio 
and the occurrence of reckless approvals can easily lead to problematic governance by 
Board. By the provisions of Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID), 
Section 18(9) (FGN, 1991), bank Directors are expected to declare to other colleagues on 
the Board, their direct or indirect interests in any credit facilities being granted. The BOFID 
provision is to forestall conflict of personal interest with that of the bank. There is no 
controversy any more regarding the bitter lessons of the 1990s from the Nigerian banking 
industry when bank Directors influenced the approval of credit facilities to their private 
and/or connected companies without declaring their interests and worse still with the 
premonition of defaulting in payment. Furthermore, we witnessed many occasions when 
several companies were hurriedly floated by Chief Executives of some new generation 
banks for the main purpose of passing several bank businesses through such companies. The 
consequence of all these was that in banks with very fragile governance processes and little 
or lack of checks and balances, widespread distress ensued, the cost of which is huge from 
the perspective of public finance. 
 
Quality of bank Directors   
There seems to be a high correlation between the quality of Directors and the Board 
performance. During the banking boom of the post-Structural Adjustment Programme in 
Nigeria, it was fashionable and rewarding to be called a bank Director. Moreover, the 
government which then controlled the shareholding of the big players used the appointment 
of bank Directors for patronage. The law stipulates that bank Directors should be people of 
unquestionable integrity, knowledgeable with a considerable degree of experience in their 
professions and committed to excellence (NDIC 1991). Evidence from the industry revealed 
that ``unfit'' persons were appointed to Boards of banks. 
Apart from the fact that they did not possess the analytical background, even where 
they were professionally sound on paper, the society was to learn very belatedly through 
their professional misconduct, about their lack of integrity in spite of the so-called quality 
control via their appointment sanctioning by the Apex institution i.e. the CBN. The 
consequence was the Directors' lack of capacity to contribute at Board and Board committee 
meetings and at occasions when they did, such contributions were either pedestrian, below 
par or not relevant at all. All of these had a further consequence on the quality issues of 
governance and leadership by the board, a situation that further worsened the remaining 
fragile reputation of bank Directors irrespective of their Boards. 
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This paper is on the relevance of corporate governance in Nigeria banks. The objective is to 
examine corporate governance issues as it affects the current financial crisis in Nigeria. The 
findings from the study revealed that there are poor corporate governance practices in some 
of the banks. This accounts for the major factor causing the present financial crisis in the 
country. This becomes very glaring when one observes some of the unethical practices 
among top banking chiefs who gave out loans without required collateral security. Other 
factors equally responsible for the crisis include poor risk management practices, inability to 
manage expansion, low assets quality and inadequate supervisory framework  
  
Recommendations  
To ensure good corporate governance in Nigerian banks the following recommendations are 
made: 
 The banks should be made to provide a certain minimum amount of information 
requirement on corporate governance. This would allow uniformity and would allow 
easy appraisal of the corporate governance practices.  
 Banks should provide an analysis of all their non-performing debts in terms of the 
ages. This will provide a picture of the risk profile of the banks.  
 Disclosures on Directors’ remuneration should be extensive as to provide 
information on who gets what and for what purpose  
 Disclosures about employees’ benefits should be extensive as to show an analysis of 
their emoluments by category not just by number  
 All banks should always provide a detailed analysis of insider-related credits 
according to performance.  
 
 Since the banking industry plays a vital role in the economy, it is essential to ensure 
that good corporate governance is in place and adhere to by the Board and Management of 
the various banks. This will enhance the confidence of the public in the banking industry.    
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